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Although bank supervision under the National Banking System exercised a light hand and panics were
frequent, depositor losses were minimal. Double liability induced shareholders to carefully monitor
bank managers and voluntarily liquidate banks early if they appeared to be in trouble. Inducing more
disclosure, marking assets to market, and ensuring prompt closure of insolvent national banks, the
Comptroller of the Currency reinforced market discipline. The arrival of the Federal Reserve weakened
this regime. Monetary policy decisions conflicted with the goal of financial stability and created moral
hazard. The appearance of the Fed as an additional supervisor led to more “competition in laxity” among
regulators and “regulatory arbitrage” by banks. When the Great Depression hit, policy-induced deflation
and asset price volatility were misdiagnosed as failures of competition and market valuation. In response,
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“An Act to provide for the establishment of Federal reserve banks, to 
furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial 
paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United 
States, and for other purposes.”—the title of the Federal Reserve Act of 
1913 [emphasis added] 
   
  While the formation and development of the Federal Reserve has been 
intensively studied, histories of the Fed, from Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz’s 
Monetary History (1963) to Allan H. Meltzer’s History of the Federal Reserve (2003-
2009), have focused almost exclusively on monetary policy.
1  The quiet work of bank 
supervision has seemed somewhat pedestrian compared to the high profile determination 
of interest rates, monetary aggregates and exchange rates. Yet, the founders of the Fed 
regarded bank supervision as a key element in their new policy regime, placing it in the 
title of the Federal Reserve Act.  Unfortunately, in spite of this headlining, the effective 
approach to bank supervision that had developed under the National Banking System was 
slowly undermined in the Fed’s first decade and a half. 
  Although the National Banking System had frequent banking panics that 
increased the severity of recessions, its regulation and supervision successfully limited 
losses to depositors.  Supervision before 1913 had a relatively light hand and may be 
characterized as a regime that aimed at reinforcing market discipline with prompt closure 
of insolvent institutions.  Its panics were primarily driven by liquidity problems rather 
than solvency issues, even if a few bank failures inaugurated a panic.  The underlying 
causes of these frequent crises were the prohibition on branch banking, which created a 
fragmented system of undiversified unit banks, and the absence of a central bank.   
  The situation in which reformers found themselves after the Crisis of 2008 
would not have been unfamiliar to the fathers of the Federal Reserve System.   After a 
half century, the banking regime created during the Civil War was outdated.  Ignited by 
the collapse of fast-growing new institutions outside the federal “safety net,” the Panic of 
1907 led to a demand for an overhaul of the regulatory system.  In response, the Federal 
                                                 
1 Even contemporary authorities remained relatively mute on the subject. Charles Dunbar’s classic banking 
text, The Theory and History of Banking (1
st ed. 1891, 5
th ed. 1929), makes on the briefest mention of 
examination and supervision: “The Board exercises many supervisory functions over the reserve banks 
which are similar to those which have long been exercised by the Comptroller of the Currency over 
national banks.  Examination of reserve banks is under its direction.”  Dunbar (1929), p. 311. 
   3
Reserve Act created a lender of last resort and sought to subject state-chartered banks and 
trust companies that had operated with weaker regulations to federal rules. 
  When the Fed opened for operation in 1914, a conflict immediately arose with 
the Comptroller of the Currency over which agency would control federal supervision.  
Competition between these agencies slowly weakened oversight of banking. In addition, 
the opening of the discount window provided a new option for troubled member banks.   
Previously, when a bank saw declining profitability and the possibility of failure, its 
directors might close the bank in advance of insolvency, fearful of the penalty of double 
liability that would fall upon them and the other shareholders, should the bank fail.   
These voluntary liquidations kept the number of actual insolvencies relatively low.   
Under the new regime, a troubled member bank now could obtain loans from the 
discount window, enabling it to continue operation in the hope of recovery.   
  Although the new Federal Reserve regime of bank supervision weakened the 
effectiveness of the pre-1913 system and raised the costs of bank failures, it left most of 
its principal elements in place.  This old regime was only toppled when the Great 
Depression led to a loss of faith in markets.  Under the New Deal, supervision designed 
to reinforce market discipline was replaced by discretionary supervision with 
forbearance, setting the stage for the crises of the late twentieth century.
2 
 
I. The Problems of the National Banking System, 1864-1913 
A. Origins 
The Panic of 1907 and subsequent recession of 1907-1908 highlighted the need to 
redesign the National Banking System. This ageing regulatory regime was the product of 
an earlier effort to tackle the key issues of how to ensure financial stability.  Following 
the expiration of the Second Bank of the United States’ charter in 1836, the federal 
government abandoned any role in the regulation of the banking system.  The states then 
experimented with a variety of regimes, but the predominant one was “free banking.”  
This type of banking system had two key characteristics: free entry or very low barriers 
to entry and the issue of banknotes by each individual bank that were guaranteed by the 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of the various U.S. supervisory regimes and regulatory issues, see Mishkin (2001), White 
(2009), and Alesina and Stella (2010).   4
purchase of an equivalent amount of state bonds valued at par.
3  After some initial 
difficulties, these state “free banking” systems expanded, providing increased 
intermediation and a relatively safe currency.  However, the unanticipated shock of Civil 
War undermined many state systems. As the values of state bonds fell, the backing or 
insurance behind banknotes declined, producing a wave of failures.
4  In 1861, there were 
1,601 banks, dropping to 1,492 a year later.
5 
Congress responded to this crisis, and the desire to build a deeper market for 
federal bonds, by creating the National Banking System.  Patterned on the states’ 
antebellum systems, the National Currency Act of 1863 and the National Bank Act of 
1864 established a federal “free banking” system. While setting high standards for 
reserve requirements, minimum capital, and lending, the objective was to create a 
nationwide federal system generating a large number of new “national” banks and 
absorbing the state banks.
6  The banknotes issued by national banks were given a much 
better backing than state banknotes had secured---U.S. government bonds---which 
ultimately provided a uniform, perfectly safe currency for the public.   The Act of 1864 
also created the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) to examine the national 
banks and ensure that they complied with the regulations.  The agency’s name 
emphasized the initial primacy of protecting the security of national banknotes.   
  In terms of the key design issues for a supervisory regime, the National Banking 
System was remarkably simple.  There was no central bank, and high-powered money 
was largely determined by the balance of payments under the Gold Standard.
7  Hence 
there was no potential conflict price stability and financial stability because of the 
monetary policy conducted by the central bank.  The absence of a central bank also made 
bank supervision completely independent.  If Congress had succeeded in winding down 
the state banking systems, with their separate state regulatory agencies, there would have 
been only one nationwide regulator of the banking system, the OCC.   Although the OCC 
was formally a bureau of the Treasury, it was granted a considerable degree of 
                                                 
3 See Rockoff (1974), Rockoff (1975), Rolnick and Weber (1983) 
4 Economoupoulos (1988), Rolnick and Weber (1984). 
5 Carter (2006), Series Cj203. 
6 For details, see James (1976) and White (1983). 
7 The United States went off the bimetallic standard in 1861.  Resumption took place in 1879, with the 
nation moving to a de facto gold standard.   5
independence.  The head of the agency, the Comptroller, was appointed by the President 
on the nomination of the Secretary of the Treasury, with the advice and consent of the 
Senate for a term of five years, freeing the Comptroller for the immediate pressures of the 
electoral cycle.  Although most pre-1914 Comptrollers did not complete a full term, some 
were renewed.
8  The Comptroller was given a salary of $5,000, but he was required to 
post a substantial bond of $100,000 for the faithful discharge of his duties.  He was also 
given a Deputy Comptroller with half the salary and half the bond and the right to hire 
the necessary clerks and examiners.  The agency reported regularly to Congress 
providing highly annual detailed reports.  Concerned about the safety of the bank-issued 
currency, the examiners valued assets according to the market and were charged with 
prompt closure in the event that they discovered a bank to be insolvent. 
Yet, state banks did not all join the National Banking System, as they recoiled at 
the prospect of meeting the new tougher national bank regulations.  In 1865, Congress 
responded to this resistance by imposing a 10 percent tax on state bank notes, a vital 
means for funding their loans.   Although state banks did not completely disappear, 
national banks became the dominant financial institutions.  This victory is seen in Figure 
1, which reports the number of banking institutions by charter type.  By 1870, there were 
1,612 national banks and a mere 325 state banks, with national banks holding 88 percent 
of all bank assets.
9  For the next two decades, national banks maintained their pre-
eminence across the country.   Although a few states permitted some limited type of 
branching, all national banks were unit or single-office banks.   Based on the National 
Banking Act’s requirement that a national bank’s “usual business shall be transacted at an 
office or banking house located in the place specified in its organization certificate,” the 






                                                 
8 The longest serving pre-1914 Comptroller was John Jay Knox, April 25, 1872-April 30, 1884. 
9 Carter (2006), Series Cj203 and Cj204. 
10 In an era where communications were slow, this decision may have made sense from an examiner’s point 
of view, as it would be difficult to examine a bank and its branches simultaneously.    6
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  Source: Carter (2006), Series Cj203, Cj212, Cj149, Bell (1928) 
 
 
B. The Re-Emergence of State Banks  
  The strict regulatory regime imposed on national banks created incentives for 
innovations that would slowly undermine National Banking System.  Given that states 
retained their authority to charter financial institutions, they played a crucial role in these 
developments, which would have profound consequences for the stability of the financial 
system.  Over the course of the next several decades, individual states, seeking to expand 
the number of financial institutions within their borders revised their bank legislation.  
They engaged in “competition in laxity” by lowering their minimum capital, reserve and 
lending requirements, which resulted in a “regulatory arbitrage” with institutions 
searching for the least onerous regulations.
11  National banks found two new competitors, 
                                                 
11 The success of the growing state banking systems ultimately forced Congress to reduce the lowest of the 
tiered minimum capital requirements.  In 1864, this requirement set $50,000 as the minimum capital for 
towns with a population under 6,000.   The Gold Standard Act of 1900 set a new lower bound of $25,000 
for the minimum capital required for banks starting up in towns with a population of under 3,000.  White 
(1983).   7
typically one type on the agricultural frontier—state banks---and the other in the growing 
urban centers---trust companies.    
Figure 2 
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Source: Carter (2006), Series Cj204, Cj213, and Cj150 and White (1983), pp. 12-13. 
 
State-chartered banking systems began to revive in the third quarter of the 
nineteenth century when states revised their banking codes and set regulations that were 
considerably weaker than those governing national banks.   Most importantly, the states 
substantially lowered the minimum capital needed to open a bank.
12  Combined with the 
general prohibition of branch banking and steady economic growth, these regulations 
encouraged a rapid increase in the number of very small banks throughout the country, 
particularly the Midwest and West.  State banks eventually outnumbered the national 
banks by late 1890s, and then experienced an explosive growth in the early twentieth 
century, garnering an increased share of assets, as seen in Figures 1 and 2.  They were 
able to expand because they developed deposit banking more quickly than national 
banks.  Figure 3 shows that before the Civil War banknotes and deposits played roughly 
                                                 
12 For details of this competition in laxity, see White (1983), Chapter 1.   8
an equal role in funding state bank lending, with capital representing the other major 
share.   By the 1850s deposit banking was gradually moving ahead of the use banknotes.  
The national banks seem to follow these trends; but the state banks, forced by the 1865 
tax to abandon note issue, focused on deposit creation, reaching a share of deposits to 
liabilities that national banks only matched in 1900.  The constraints on national banknote 
issue, notably the declining number of outstanding U.S. government bonds, kept 
banknotes’ share of funding very modest.
13 The result was the national bank regulations 
that “insured” banknotes protected a smaller and smaller share of bank customers, as 
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Source: Carter (2006), Series Cj159, Cj160, Cj155, Cj170, Cj156, Cj204, Cj227, Cj209, Cj209, 
Cj210, Cj235. 
 
                                                 
13 There is a large literature on the “conundrum” of low national banknote issue.  For example, see James 
(1976), Cagan and Schwartz (1991), and Champ, Wallace, and Weber (1992).   9
The result of the rapid growth of single office banks was the emergence of two 
serious weaknesses in the American banking system that did not appear in Canadian or 
European banking systems where branching was permitted and entry often limited by 
high initial minimum capital requirements:  (1) Many small American banks’ loan and 
deposit bases were relatively undiversified so they were more vulnerable to shocks and 
prone to failure and (2) An elaborate correspondent banking system was necessary to link 
these banks with national money markets and facilitate the clearing of checks. The 
correspondent system was further encouraged by high federal and state reserve 
requirements that permitted banks to hold their part of their reserves outside of their own 
vault and in accounts at major city banks where they earned interest. These large pools of 
liquid funds, concentrated primarily in New York, were invested by city banks in call 
loans to the stock market.   The financial system was thus integrated but potentially 
fragile.  Panicked country banks could withdrawal their deposited funds from money 
centers, stressing city banks and financial markets. This fragmentation of the banking 
system and the correspondent banking system thus played key roles in nineteenth century 
panics, including 1907.   
 
C. The Rise of the Trust Companies 
The second class of institutions that challenged the National Banking System was 
the trust companies, permitted to combine traditional banking with trust operations, 
which were banned to national banks.  These institutions opened under state charters with 
regulations that were often weaker than the regulations governing state banks.
14  They 
prospered in the financial centers where they became tough competitors of national 
banks.
15  Trust companies grew at an astonishing rate in New York State.  In 1897, 
national banks had $915 million in assets, state banks $297 million, and trust companies 
$396 million in New York.
16  But only a decade later, in 1907, while national banks had 
grown to $1.8 billion and state banks to $541 million, trust companies had expanded to 
$1.4 billion in assets.  The effects of the new entrants on the banking system are visible in 
Figures 1 and 3.   The number of trust companies rose quickly in the last decade of the 
                                                 
14 Barnett (1911) 
15 Neal (1971). 
16 See Barnett (1911) p. 235, for more details.   10
nineteenth and the first decade of the twentieth centuries. As they were larger urban 
institutions, they did not challenge national and state banks in sheer numbers, but they did 
garnered a larger share of all bank assets. While their share was just over 20 percent 
nationally, they were more important in financial centers.  Furthermore, they operated 
outside the federal regulatory system, sometimes with only modest state oversight. 
The fragmented system of unit banks, tied together by correspondent balances, 
could turn a banking panic by the public into a bankers’ panic.  In spite of this fragility, 
there was no central bank.  Central banks were created by most developed countries by 
the end of the nineteenth century; but the political economy of the U.S. prevented the 
establishment of one.  The problems created by the absence of a central bank were 
highlighted by the discussion about the “inelasticity” of national banknotes or what today 
would be termed the inability to expand high-powered money/currency to the financial 
system in response to crises. National banknotes were tied to the outstanding stock of 
government bonds, and they did not increase when there was a flight to cash during 
seasonal stringencies, common in this period, and financial panics.  
The private market provided only a partial solution to the absence of a central 
bank by its temporary issue of clearing house loan certificates in crises.  These 
instruments, backed by the assets of individual banks, gave some additional liquidity, 
especially to the clearing operations between banks.  But to participate, banks had to be 
members of the clearing houses.  In these institutions, banks had to trust one another 
completely because of the large balances that they built up against one another before 
settlement.  To alleviate concern, they monitored each other more closely and frequently 
than the official federal and state regulators.  Thus, they had particularly good 
information on the solvency of their members.  During panics, the creation of high 
denomination clearing house loan certificates enabled banks to replace coin and 
banknotes in their clearing house exchanges, enabling their to pay out more cash to their 
nervous depositors.  Their success eventually led to the issuance of small denomination 
notes that circulated with the public briefly in times of crisis.
17 
Clearing house loan certificates helped to alleviate earlier panics, but the Panic of 
1907 reflected the most recent evolution of the financial system: the emergence of the 
                                                 
17 Cannon (1910), Friedman and Schwartz (1963).   11
trust companies as a “shadow” banking system, competing with but not fully accepted by 
their more heavily regulated rivals, the banks.  As they did not conform to the same 
regulations as the banks, they could only corresponding members not full of the clearing 
houses, as the banks were dead set against allowing these rivals to gain the added 
protection of the clearing house.  The Panic of 1907 exploded when the Knickerbocker 
Trust Company, a major New York financial institution approached the New York 
Clearing House for assistance.  When it was denied, the news prompted a run on all trust 
companies that eventually spread to the banks.  Neither the intervention by J.P. Morgan 
or the U.S. Treasury proved sufficient to halt this panic, which was only contained by the 




The obvious fear of reformers in the latter years of the National Banking era was 
the frequency and severity of banking panics, which occurred at both regional and 
national levels.  Two studies commissioned by the National Monetary Commission, 
established after the Panic of 1907, examined these crises.  O.M.W. Sprague’s volume 
focused on the crises of 1890, 1893 and 1907 but Edwin W. Kemmerer’s close reading of 
the Commercial and Financial Chronicle uncovered eight major and twenty-one minor 
panics.
19  Subsequent scholarship has identified five major banking panics between 1864 
and the founding of the Fed: 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893 and 1907.
20  Some of these panics 
did not degenerate into a full-blown scramble for liquidity, and 1884 and 1890 are 
sometimes classified as “incipient panics” or moments of “financial distress.”  
It is widely agreed that these panics had severe consequences for the economy.  
Pointing to six recessions that hit the U.S. between 1895 and 1912, Allan H. Meltzer 
concluded that “financial panics, interest rates temporarily at an annual rate of 100 
percent or more, financial failures, and bankruptcies were much too frequent.”
21 He 
emphasized that other countries did not suffer the financial trauma that afflicted the U.S. 
economy because they had lenders of last resort.  Compared to the post-World War II era, 
                                                 
18 Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Moen and Tallman (1992) 
19 Sprague (1910), Kemmerer (1910). 
20 See Jalil (2009) for a discussion of the differences between the standard sources on the classification of 
banking panics.  
21 Meltzer (2003), p.9   12
Christina Romer determined that the pre-Fed era had greater volatility in GNP, industrial 
production, commodity output, and the unemployment rate.
22  While the length of 
recessions was about the same, expansions were considerably longer in the post-World 
War II period.  In general, she found that the frequency and severity recessions were 
greater before the founding of the Fed.  For the years, 1890-1908, Jeffrey Miron reported 
that panic years had substantially lower real GNP growth than non-panic years and that 
the elimination of major panics after the founding of the Fed shortened the length of 
recessions from 17.5 to 14.25 months.
23 Most recently, Andrew J. Jalil confirmed that 
panics independently and significantly diminished the growth of output and contributed 
to deflation.  More importantly, recessions with major banking panics were more severe 
and longer than recessions without panics.
24 
  While most scholars would agree that the severity of the 2007-2009 recession was 
amplified by the Panic of 2008, confirming the pre-1914 pattern, the pre-Fed panics were 
different.  In contrast to the most recent financial collapses, including the banking/savings 
and loan disaster of the 1980s and the Crisis of 2008, the panics of the National Banking 
Era were primarily liquidity events rather than solvency events. The scramble for 
liquidity contributed to the severity of economic downturns, but the panics were not 
driven by widespread bank insolvencies nor did they create insolvencies that ultimately 
led to substantial losses to shareholders, depositors and other stakeholders.  As liquidity 
events, the banking industry was subject to massive withdrawals of deposited funds by 
the public and corresponding banks often leading to a suspension of payments.  However, 
unlike contemporary events, the solvency of the entire banking industry or even a 
significant fraction was not ultimately in question.  In this pre-1914 world, bank 
regulation and supervision played a crucial role in setting the incentives that limited 
solvency problems. 
  
                                                 
22 Romer (1990) compares the years 1886-1916 with 1948-1997, and 27. 
23 Miron (1986) Additionally, for the National Banking era, Grossman (1993) found that a “small bank 
failure” shock could lead to a 2 percent decline in real GNP while a large bank failure shock could produce 
a 20 percent decline in GNP. 
24 For the years 1825-1914, the average decline in output for recessions with panics was 7.9 percent, with 
the average time from peak-to-trough 1.4 years and trough-to-pre-downturn peak 1.7 years, contrasting 4.8 
percent, 1.2 years and 1 year for recessions without panics.  If only the post-Civil War era is considered the 
severity and length of recessions with panics is even greater. Jalil (2009), p. 34.    13
II. Supervision, 1864-1913 
  A. Disclosure  
  Of the three basic components of bank supervision---disclosure, examination, 
and disciplinary action---disclosure was emphasized under the National Banking System.  
The emphasis on disclosure reflected the belief that market discipline was the best means 
to ensure the soundness of banks.  Because there was detailed proprietary information 
that could not be revealed to the public, examinations also played a key role in ensuring 
bank solvency; but, apart from fines for late disclosure of information, the only 
disciplinary actions a Comptroller could take were the revocation of a bank’s charter and 
the declaration of a suspension with appointment of receivers to liquidate the bank. 
  The OCC was established to ensure compliance with the new federal 
regulations.
25  Initially, national banks were required to provide a detailed quarterly 
report and a very limited monthly statement.  The fixed dates and absence of auditing 
permitted banks to engage in “window dressing.” In 1869, Congress responded to 
Comptrollers complaints and instituted “call” reports of condition to improve disclosure.  
National banks were required to provide the Comptroller with five call reports per year 
with information on their balance sheets; and three of these were set on dates randomly 
chosen by the Comptroller to limit opportunities for manipulation of banks’ books.     
Every day’s delay in delivery of the call report was subject to $100 fine.
26  These reports 
appear to have provided significant information, as they were valued by the financial 
industry.  Banks in Reserve Cities requested the Comptroller to publish more frequent 
information from the call reports so that they could better follow the changing condition 





                                                 
25 Regular examinations first appeared in the United States before the Civil War when six states, New 
York, Vermont, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio and Iowa. Robertson, (1968), pp. 25-6. 
26 Banks were required to report the payment of a dividend within ten days or face a similar penalty 
Robertson, (1968), pp. 79-81.   
27 In the 1889 Annual Report, the Comptroller asked for an additional appropriation $10,000 to fulfill to a 
request from the American Bankers Association to publish not only call report data for each national bank 
on the date nearest the first of October but also for the date nearest the first of April.  U.S. Comptroller of 
the Currency (1889), pp.53-54.   14
  B. Examination and Discipline 
  While providing information on the general condition of a bank, the call reports 
were aggregate by nature, and examination was thus a vital component of supervision for 
detecting fraud and ensuring compliance with regulations by delving into details of bank 
operations that would be deemed proprietary and inappropriate for public disclosure.  The 
initial purpose behind the examinations was to ensure that banks would be able to redeem 
their banknotes upon presentation.  Examinations were conducted from the “bottom up” 
where examiners scrutinized the cash, assets and accounts of the bank to ensure that they 
complied with the letter of the law.
28  Although Comptrollers sent examiners instructions 
for examination, they emphasized that there could be no “cast-iron rules covering minute 
details.”
29  
  The Comptroller of the Currency was charged with performing a minimum of 
two examinations per year for all national banks.  These examinations were to be 
unannounced so the bank officials had no opportunity to hide any problems.  Examiners 
were appointed by the Comptroller with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury.  
Their compensation was set by statute, as were the assessments levied on banks to fund 
their payment. Out of these fees, examiners had to pay for expenses and their assistants.  
Beyond these very basic tenets, no limits were set on the number of examiners that could 
be appointed; and there were no fixed terms of office, oath of office, bond, or 
geographical districts, leaving the Comptroller with considerable discretion for 
deployment of his examiners.
30  Yet, the Comptroller’s ability to increase disclosure by 
printing more frequent call reports or managing examiners by expanding his staff were 
limited by fact that his office in Washington D.C. was funded by Congressional 
appropriation and increases were rarely forthcoming.      
National bank examiners were paid a fee for examining a bank, based on the 
bank’s capital. Before the 1875 Amendment to the National Bank Act, an examiner was 
paid $5 for each day of examination and $2 for every 25 miles he traveled by the 
                                                 
28 Officers and directors must be “complying with the requirements of the law and whether they are in any 
way violating any of its provisions.” U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, (1881), p. 35-6. 
29 U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, (1891), p. 26. 
30 U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, (1889), p. 54.   15
examined bank.
31  As large city banks were bigger and more complex, compensation for 
examiners of banks in reserve cities was determined by the Secretary of the Treasury 
upon recommendation of the Comptroller. A schedule of assessments for banks was set to 
fund these fees. For banks outside of the established reserve cities, the examination fee 
ranged from $20 for a bank with capital under $100,000 to $75 for a bank with a capital 
over $600,000.   
  Although examinations were supposed to be unannounced, the surprise was 
often compromised by the predictability of an examiner’s travel plans given his efforts to 
minimize cost, enabling banks to prepare for a visit if forewarned.  Comptrollers 
regularly complained about the incentive effects of these legislated fees. In Hearings 
before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, Representative Joseph W. 
Babcock reported that cashiers in a chain bank that had been visited by an examiner 
would telegraph to the other member banks, “the examiner here to-day; lookout, he is 
coming.”
32 In the 1901, Annual Report, Comptroller William Ridgely recommended the 
payment of fixed salaries to examiners instead of fees.
33 Ridgely reiterated his complaint 
in his report of 1906.
34  However, Congress remained immune to these pleas throughout 
the National Banking era. 
  The third and last element of supervision, disciplinary action, was limited to 
moral suasion the revocation a bank’s charter. Consequently, prudential supervision was 
circumscribed, with the Comptroller relying upon the cooperation of the directors and 
officers of a bank to correct violations.
35  Although many Comptrollers emphasized the 
importance of discussing the principles of good management with bank officials and 
requesting correction of problems, the Office of the Comptroller did not accept 
responsibility for a bank’s mistakes.  Comptroller Knox wrote:  
 
                                                 
31 Robertson, (1968), pp. 76-79. 
32 U.S. House of Representatives, (1894), p. 197. 
33 U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, (1901), p. XVIII. 
34 “This is a matter of very great importance in the interest of good administration, and the effective 
supervision of national banks.  Every Comptroller of the Currency has agreed in this opinion, and has 
recommended that this change be made.  The examination and supervision of national banks will never be 
what it should be, until this recommendation is carried out.” U.S. Comptroller, (1906), p. 65. 
35 Robertson, (1968) p. 71, note 13.   16
It is scarcely to be expected, if a robber or a forger is placed in control of 
all its assets; that a national bank can be saved from disaster by the 
occasional visits of an examiner.
36  
  
  C. The Operation of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
  Supervision by the OCC was thus intended to reinforce market discipline, 
primarily through disclosure requirements and surprise examinations, where assets were 
marked to market and prompt closure was enforced for insolvent institutions.  A review 
of the extant records of the OCC reveals a remarkably light supervisory hand, as one 
might expect in such a regime. 
  Table 1 presents some basic numbers about national banks and the OCC from 
1884, when the first budgetary data was reported, to 1913.
37  The second to fourth 
columns of Table 1 report the number of national banks and their nominal and real 
assets.
38  The more rapid growth after 1900 reflects effects of the Gold Standard Act of 
1900, which lowered the minimum capital requirement, permitting entry of considerably 
smaller institutions.  At the same time the size of large city institutions was expanding, so 
that even with the growth of small banks the average size of a bank was 20 percent larger 
in real terms after 1900 compared to the previous decade. Columns 5 and 6 show the total 
nominal and real assessments levied on the banks to cover the salaries and expenses of 
examiners.  Unfortunately, the number of examiners in Column 7 is much rarer 
information; but taken with the data on revenues to pay their compensation, the pattern 
shows a very modestly-sized agency growing with its expanding industry..  In 1889, there 
were only 30 examiners for 3,239 national banks.  The number of examiners grew, 
increasing from 75 in 1902 to 114 in 1908.  Yet, this remained a small staff, as the 





                                                 
36 U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, (1881), pp. 38. 
37 There may have been a very important private complement to the limited examinations under the OCC in 
this period.  The 1907 U.S. Comptroller of the Currency’s  Annual Report mentions the examination by the 
clearing houses and their improving quality.  See Cannon (1910), pp. 137-147. 
38 The GDP deflator is used to measure the real values. Carter (2006), Series Ca13.   17
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1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
1884  2,625 2,283  2,908 99,642 126,941     
1885  2,689 2,422  3,134 107,782 139,460     
1886  2,809 2,475  3,282 107,273 142,266     
1887  3,014 2,637  3,461 110,220 144,627     
1888  3,120 2,731  3,578 121,778 159,512     
1889  3,239 2,938  3,946 130,726 175,560  30 108
1890  3,484 3,062  4,142 136,773 185,016     
1891  3,652 3,113  4,166 138,969 185,959     
1892  3,759 3,494  4,625 161,984 214,441     
1893  3,807 3,213  4,246 162,445 214,669     
1894  3,770 3,422  4,689 251,967 345,236     
1895  3,715 3,471  4,799 238,252 329,479     
1896  3,689 3,354  4,596 237,804 325,830     
1897  3,610 3,563  4,882 222,859 305,354     
1898  3,581 3,978  5,391 225,445 305,521     
1899  3,582 4,709  6,324 244,904 328,896     
1900  3,731 4,944  6,487 259,165 340,068     
1901  4,163 5,674  7,266 277,816 355,758     
1902  4,532 6,007  7,524 307,297 384,897  75 60
1903  4,935 6,285  7,554 324,599 390,148  74 67
1904  5,330 6,653  7,820 346,895 407,725  76 70
1905  5,664 7,325  8,582 388,307 454,962  83 68
1906  6,047 7,781  8,838 396,766 450,678  91 66
1907  6,422 8,472  9,095 425,158 456,446  100 64
1908  6,817 8,710  9,405 429,398 463,675  114 60
1909  6,886 9,365  10,113 510,928 551,713     
1910  7,138 9,892  10,410 524,039 551,464     
1911  7,270 10,378  10,968 492,269 520,239  113* 64
1912  7,366 10,857  11,035 526,170 534,795     
1913  7,467 11,032  11,137 556,210 561,493     
 
Source: U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, (1884-1913). 
*Estimate based on the average salary of an examiner and total salaries. 
 
  Examiners had considerable independence in conducting their examinations and 
hiring and paying their assistants, though the number of these individuals was apparently   18
never reported to the Comptroller.
39  Nevertheless, given the fixed compensation it is 
unlikely that the number of these assistants grew relative to the number of examiners over 
time, and thus the number of examiners and assessments represent a reasonable proxy for 
the effort expended in examination.  The independence of examiners seems to have left 
some Comptrollers uncomfortable, and there were frequent requests to Congress to 
amend the National Bank Act to gain control over the appointment of assistants, set fixed 
salaries for both examiners and assistants, and require them to post bonds while taking an 
oath of office.
40  However, there was no response from Capital Hill. 
  Even though the number of banks per examiner fell from over 100 in 1889, it 
remains to modern eyes, surprisingly high.  For the period 1902 to 1911, it varied 
between 60 and 70 examiners per bank.   At two required visits a year, each examiner 
would have to be performing 120 to 140 examinations per year.  Given the time needed 
for travel between banks in the rural part of the country and given the size and 
complexity of large city banks, these reports could not have been exhaustive.   
Furthermore, bank assets appear to have been growing faster than the number of 
examiners.   They rose from $80 million per examiner in 1902 to $91 million in 1911, 
suggesting that visits to a bank required more and more work. 
  In spite of this work load, national bank examiners seem to have been relatively 
well compensated.  The average compensation for an examiner for 1902-1911 was 
approximately $4,307.  Even if their expenses consumed up to half of this sum, their pay 
would appear to be good in comparison to the Deputy Comptroller who was paid a salary 
of $2,500, the clerks in the OCC’s Washington D.C. office who received $900 to $1800 
or perhaps even the Comptroller who earned $5,000.
41  At the same time, the average cost 
of an examination remained relatively low for a bank, rising from about $40 to $70 per 
year during this fifty year period.   
  Relatively little was written about the actual work of national bank examiners, 
given the confidential nature of their activities.  One very knowledgeable banker, James 
                                                 
39 The U.S. Comptroller of the Currency’s Annual Report (1889) provides a description of some aspects of 
examination and refers to “the examiner, assisted by competent assistants.” p. 55. 
40 U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, (1889), pp. 57. 
41 U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, (1889), pp. 85-86.   19
B. Forgan, President of the First National Bank of Chicago believed that examiners had 
good intelligence about the state of a bank: 
 
A competent examiner—and there are many such now in the government 
employ—while he can not pass judgment on all the loans in a bank, can, 
after a careful examination, or series of examinations, form a wonderfully 
correct judgment as to the general character of its assets and as to whether 




Yet, examiners were not always this well-received. The Comptroller reported that while 
“some bank officers look upon the work of the examiners as unnecessary and 
inquisitorial,” the “benefits derived from the visits of a competent examiner are, as a rule, 
fully appreciated by the managers of the associations.”
43 The Comptroller found that this 
“friendly attitude” was more common among banks “possessing ample capital and 
transacting an extended business” where the managers would not be able to personally 
supervise all the details of the business.  Therefore, an independent knowledgeable 
outside review was sometimes appreciated in these circumstances.  Examinations, except 
when fraud or insolvency was discovered, remained advisory.  Forgan summarized the 
value of an examination: 
 
Examinations, as they are now conducted, have a most beneficial 
influence on bank management, especially by way of restraint.  The 
correspondence carried on by the Comptroller, based on the examiners’ 
reports, does an inestimable lot of good in the way of forcing bank officers 
to comply with the law and in compelling them to face and provide for 
known losses as they occur.  Supervision by examination does not, 
however, carry with it control of management and can not, therefore, be 
held responsible for either errors of judgment or lapses of integrity.   
Examination is always an event after the act, having no control over a 
bank’s initiative, which rests exclusively with the executive officers and 
directors, and depends entirely on their business ability, judgment, and 
honest of purpose.
44 
   
  Well aware that the examination process gave him only an advisory role, the 
Comptroller appears to have become much more anxious after the Panic of 1907.   
                                                 
42 Cannon (1910), p. 138. 
43 U.S. Comptroller, pp. 55-56 
44 Cannon (1910), p.138.   20
Attempting to pressure bank directors to become more attentive to the problems of 
national banks, the Comptroller ordered examiners to ask directors a set of fixed 
questions.  When Philadelphia’s national bank examiner, Frank L. Norris confronted the 
directors of the Philadelphia National Bank in 1908, they were angry and resentful.   
Questions included “How many of the Directors know the conditions of the Bank in all 
its details?” How many know nothing at all about the condition of the Bank? “Have the 
Directors full knowledge of the habits and general standing of the Bank’s employees?”  
The president of the bank answered them perfunctorily and protested the right of the 
Comptroller to interrogate its directors and officers.
45 
  The Comptroller’s frustration appears to have been increasing on the eve of the 
passage of the Federal Reserve Act, even though there was no apparent increase in the 
number of insolvencies or their costs.  The 1912 Annual Report reported an effort by the 
Comptroller to more forcefully engage the directors of national banks in the process of 
examination.
46  The Comptroller reported that for years the agency had been urging 
directors to create examining committees of their own to look into the affairs of their 
banks at stated intervals, in order to supplement the work of the national bank 
examiners.
47  The Comptroller complained that directors did not understand the nature of 
examinations and were unfamiliar with “the proper methods of verifying many assets and 
liabilities of the bank.”
48  To remedy the situation, the Comptroller send a circular to all 
national banks on July 9, 1912, directing them to ensure that the directors would be able 
to provide national bank examiners will the best possible assistance at the next 
examination.  In spite of these efforts by the Comptroller, the system of supervision set 





                                                 
45Wainwright, (1953), p. 165. 
46 The concern about the quality of management appears to have been shared the Clearing Houses.   Before 
the Panic of 1907, only the Chicago Clearing House had appointed an examiner (in 1906) to examine its 
member banks on a regular basis.  Afterwards, the clearing houses in Minneapolis-St. Paul, St. Louis, Los 
Angeles, Kansas City and Philadelphia employed an examiner.  Cannon (1910), pp. 137-147. 
47 U.S. Comptroller, (1912), p., 854-85 
48 U.S. Comptroller, (1912), p. 84.   21
  D. The Supervision of State Banks 
  Like regulation, supervision of state-chartered banks was generally lighter than 
the supervision experienced by national banks.  In some states, the creation of a state 
bank commission or state banking board only occurred after the Panic of 1907.  In 
general, the federal system of supervision came to be regarded as best practice; and the 
slow drift to adopting rules similar to those for the Comptroller of the Currency sped up 
after 1907.  While state banks were generally subject to weaker supervision than national 
banks, trust companies largely escaped state supervision until after 1907.  In New York, 
for example, the superintendant of banking did not have the power to take possession of a 
failing trust company until 1907, although he had been given this power for state banks in 
1892.
49 
For most of the National Banking era, state banks were required to provide one or 
two reports per year on their condition to a designated state official on specified dates.  
Towards the end of the period, states revised their laws on disclosure and followed the 
OCC’s practice of requiring reports on days that were not known in advance by banks.
50  
Yet, even in 1910, the number of required reports was generally fewer than the 
Comptroller’s five. Only nine states required five annual reports, twenty-two required 
four, nine required two, four required three, and one required one report.  In all cases, 
state law required that the reports be published in local newspapers.   After the Panic of 
1907, more states came to regard the Comptroller’s rules as best practice and several 
began making “call reports” on the same days as the OCC.
51 
  Regular examinations only began to become the norm for state banks in the latter 
years of the century.  Before 1887, only New York, Indiana, Minnesota, California and 
Iowa required regular examinations, though five additional states could make 
examinations if they believed that a bank was in trouble.
52  By 1910, 41 states and 
territories authorized regular examinations of state banks, though twenty only called for 
one annual examination.  Some of these states only set up regular examinations after the 
Panic of 1907.  For example, California had no state supervision by examination until 
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1909, when responding to public concern and a plan by the clearing houses to institute 
their own examinations, the legislature empowered the state supervisor to conduct 
them.
53  In almost all states, examiners were paid a fixed salary, in contrast to the fees for 
national bank examiners that so troubled the Comptrollers.  Most of the funds to 
compensate state examiners came from fees assessed on the banks. 
  Like the Comptroller, state bank supervisors’ powers over their chartered banks 
was circumscribed and generally limited to taking action only when a bank was 
determined to be insolvent.  While the Comptroller gained no additional authority 
immediately after the Panic of 1907, state legislatures granted more powers and 
discretion to state bank supervisors.  By 1920, fifteen states gave bank supervisors the 
authority to “direct the discontinuance of unsafe and unauthorized practices.”
54   A post-
panic New York special commission was blunt:  
 
Under existing law, he (the superintendent of banks) may criticize 
objectionable practices when they come to his knowledge, and report 
continued delinquencies to the attorney-general.  His criticism is hence in 
large measure academic and may be given scant consideration by 
delinquents…..Were he clothed with the powers to “direct the 
discontinuance of unsafe practices,” no institution would dare continue the 
same after having been admonished by him.
55  
 
Interestingly, no ability to fine or otherwise discipline banks, short of closure, was 
considered.  Even in this respect, state bank supervisors had less power than the 
Comptroller of the Currency.   The Comptroller had the power to appoint a receiver for a 
national bank, but a state bank examiner had to apply to the courts to appoint receivers 
for state banks and trust companies.  Only after the Panic of 1907 did some states begin 
to follow the national bank practice.
56 
  The minimal data that is available for the state banking authorities suggests that 
the resources available for state supervisors were more modest than those at the disposal 
of the Comptroller.  The OCC’s 1911 Annual Report provided a brief survey of the state 
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systems of examination.  According to this report, there were a total 224 state bank 
examiners for all states, compared to the 113 national bank examiners.  However there 
were far more state banks, numbering 17,913,
57 implying that there were 80 state banks 
per state bank examiner, significantly more than the 64 banks per national bank 
examiner.  This higher workload was not accompanied by higher compensation.   State 
bank examiners were paid an average of $2,300 compared to the average national bank 
examiner income of $4,356.
58 Overall, while national bank supervision may have 
exercised a light hand, state surveillance of state-chartered banks and trust companies 
was minimal in the third-quarter of the nineteenth century and then slowly began to move 
towards the OCC’s model of supervision. 
 
III. Consequences and Costs of Supervision, 1864-1913 
A.  The Role of Double Liability 
  To evaluate the effectiveness of supervision in the National Banking era, there 
is one additional important feature of bank regulation---double liability---that needs to be 
discussed but which has hitherto received relatively attention.
59   Concerned about the 
incentives for shareholders, Congress imposed double liability on the shareholders of 
national banks in the National Banking Act.  In discussion of the Act, Senator John 
Sherman emphasized that the purpose of the rule was not only to provide greater 
protection from loss in the event of a failure but also to provide the appropriate incentives 
to shareholders.  He argued that in addition to giving security to creditors, double liability 
“tends to prevent the stockholders and directors of a bank from engaging in hazardous 
operations.”
60 
  Under the national banks’ double liability rule, if a bank failed, shareholders at 
the time of failure could be forced to pay an assessment up to the par value of the stock in 
order to compensate depositors and other creditors.  This regulation provided a strong 
incentive to owners to check the risk-taking activities of bank management.  If a bank 
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59 Grossman (2001, 2007, 2010) is the only exception.  He provides a careful survey of liability rules but 
probably understates their effects as his analysis focuses on the differences in liability among the state 
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were faring poorly, the directors of a bank had the statutory right to vote to voluntarily 
liquidate the bank while it was still solvent, enabling them to protect shareholders from 
assessments.  Consequently, to understand the operation of bank supervision, one needs 
to look at both insolvencies and voluntary liquidations---a phenomenon that has been 
overlooked.      
  Like many other dimensions of bank regulation, the assignment of liability to 
shareholders of state banks evolved over the National Banking Era.  In 1870, 12 states 
imposed single liability, 18 states double, and the remainder had no law or statutes that 
were ambiguous.
61  By 1900, only five states did not fix shareholder liability, while 11 
states elected to impose single liability and 32 chose double liability.  However, there was 
a notable difference between the states assignment of liability and the National Banking 
Act.  While the Comptroller had the right to impose an assessment on shareholders to pay 
out depositors, creditors of failed state banks, in most states, had to pursue shareholders 
in court, making collection of funds more costly and difficult.  Furthermore, this state 
liability was enforceable only after the assets of the bank have been exhausted.  In 
contrast, a national bank receiver could impose an assessment and begin distribution to 
depositors before a bank was finally closed.
62 Given this generally weaker liability 
regime for state banks, it would be expected that the constraints on risk-taking would be 
reduced and it would be less likely that a troubled banks would voluntarily liquidated 
before it became insolvent. 
 
  B. Voluntary Liquidations and Failures 
  A comparison of national bank and state bank voluntary liquidations would be 
very instructive, but unfortunately, there are is no data on state bank voluntary 
liquidations.  Consequently, analysis must be limited to national banks.  Figures 4 and 5 
display the number of national bank voluntary liquidations and insolvencies and the 
percentage of these relative to the total number of national banks.  For the National 
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62 Barnett (1911), pp. 78-85. Seven states did provide an additional guarantee for depositors after 1907 in 
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Banking era, over four times the number of banks, 2,373 were voluntarily liquidated 
compared to 501 that were closed as insolvent.  The total capital of voluntarily liquidated 
banks was $432.8 million and for insolvent banks it was $89.1 million.
63  
  To the twenty-first century eye, the surprising feature of these charts is the 
number of banks that were placed in voluntary liquidation compared to the number that 
were insolvent.  It suggests that shareholders and directors were quite cautious.  When 
directors voluntarily liquidated a bank they appear to have been successful in picking the 
right moment, as few of these banks were subsequently found to be insolvent.
64  When a 
bank was past saving, it was quickly closed by the authorities, revealing a readiness to 
close an insolvent bank that stands in stark contrast to today when closed banks all show 
substantial losses. Occasionally, the Comptroller erred and suspended a bank that was 
later found to be technically solvent and some of these were re-opened. 
Figure 4 












































  Source: U.S. Comptroller of the Currency (various years). 
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64 A few of the liquidating banks were consolidated with other banks.   26
  Figures 4 and 5 also suggest that the worst years for national bank failures were 
the 1890s when the number and percentages of insolvencies peaked.   By the first decade 
of the twentieth century, insolvencies have sunk to the low levels preceding the nineties, 
while voluntary liquidations are considerably higher.  Whether it was the chastising 
experience of the 1890s or the increased vigilance of examiners, thanks to the growth in 
their number seen in Table 1, the national banking system appears to have more carefully 
protected the interested of its depositors. 
 
Figure 5 













































Source: U.S. Comptroller of the Currency (various years). 
 
  What losses were experienced by insolvent banks?  Figures 6 and 7 show the 
number and percentage of national banks, state banks, and trust companies declared to be 
insolvent in each year between 1864 and 1913. Unfortunately, there is limited data for 
failures of state banks and trust companies before the 1890s; however failures of all types 
of institutions do appear to have been more frequent in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century than in the first decade of the twentieth, in spite of the severity of the Panic of   27
1907.  For the years where there is comparable data, the percentage of state banks failing 
was greater than the percentage of national banks and the percentage of trust companies 
failing higher than both.   There is a notable spike in trust company failures in 1907, 
reflecting their fate during the Panic of 1907. 
 
Figure 6 











































National Banks State Banks Trust Companies
 
Sources: Barnett (1911), pp. 187, 190, 193, and 195; U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, (1913), p. 
104. 
 
These higher failure rates by state banks and especially trust companies suggest 
that they may have been taking greater risks. Because of the regulations that promoted 
smaller, less diversified state banks, they might be expected to have a higher failure rate 
and a higher loss rate.  They might have protected themselves by increasing their capital 
relative to their assets to offset this danger.  Figure 8 graphs the capital to asset ratio for 
state banks and national banks from 1834 until the creation of the Federal Reserve.  This 
longer time frame provides a necessary perspective on the risk exposure of these 
institutions.  Unfortunately, trust companies did not provide reports in most states that   28
would enable an aggregate national capital to asset ratio to be measured for this group of 
intermediaries. 
Figure 7 
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Sources: Barnett (1911), pp. 187, 190, 193, and 195; Comptroller of the Currency, (1913), p. 104. 
and Carter (2006).Series Cj203 and Cj212. 
 
  Figure 8 captures the well-known long downward trend of the capital to asset 
ratio over the course of the nineteenth century.
65 This key ratio hovered around 40 
percent for state banks in the late antebellum period, though it was higher in the 1840s.  
Visually, the national bank capital to asset ratio appears to continue the trend for pre-
Civil War state banks, ultimately falling to around 20 percent.  The surprise in Figure 8 is 
the much lower capital asset ratio for state banks in the late nineteenth century, 
suggesting that they were taking greater risks than national banks and perhaps higher 
returns.  This assessment probably understates their risk-taking as their loan portfolios 
were not as constrained as national banks in most states, permitting them for example to 
lend extensively on real estate, enabling a greater maturity mismatch.  If local banking 
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markets had been fully competitive, one would not expect to see the persistently lower 
capital to asset ratio and higher failure rates for state-chartered institutions.  But, local 
banking markets, especially on the frontier had strong elements of local monopolies.     
The lower minimum capital requirements of state banks permitted the creation very small 
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  Source: Carter (2006) Series Cj150, Cj 157, Cj159, Cj175, Cj204, Cj211, Cj213, and Cj236.  
 
 
  C. The Costs of Bank Failures 
The record of costs from the closure of national banks looks quite favorable 
relative to the experience of the Great Depression, the S&Ls crisis, or the 2008 financial 
collapse. Between 1865 and 1913, 540 banks were declared to be insolvent.   This 
number is higher than the 501 insolvencies that were compared to voluntary liquidations 
in Figures 5 because 39 were restored to solvency.   These 540 national banks had an 
                                                 
66 Bodenhorn (1995) and  James (1978).   30
initial capital of $86.8 million or roughly on average $160,000 each.  The total assets of 
these banks on the date that were closed were $360 million, of which 35.9 percent were 
estimated to be good, 31.5 percent to be doubtful, and 18.9 percent to be worthless with 
an additional 13.5 percent recovered since suspension.  There were $28.6 million of 
offsets for these banks.  The receivers recouped $183.9 million from the sales of assets 
and $22.5 million in assessments on shareholders or 89.5 and 10.5 percent of the total 
collections.  Tracking down and enforcing the assessments was clearly difficult and 
costly.  Receivers assessed shareholders $46.4 million but recovered only 48.6 percent of 
the total.   The costs of closing these banks down were modest, with $5.4 million spent on 
legal expenses and $9.5 million spent on receivers’ salaries or 4.1 percent of assets and 
7.8 percent of the proven claims.   Payments to depositors and other creditors totaled 
$146.9 million out of  $191.0 million of proven claims for a payout ratio of 76.9 percent.  
Total losses thus amounted to $44 million for this 50 year period.    
Figure 9 































Number of Failures Percentage Payout
 
  Source: U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, (1918). 
Note: The payout ratio is calculated as the payments divided by the proven claims.  If offsets are 
included, the recoveries by depositors would be higher.   31
  The sum of $44 million represents a very modest cost, no matter how it is 
measured.  In 2009 dollars, $44 million is approximately $1 billion, which would seem a 
relatively small sum for the cumulative losses. On average, losses were $880,000 per 
year.  This was a tiny fraction of the deposits of national banks, which even in 1870 stood 
at $706 million in 1870, growing to $1,085 million in 1880 and $1,978 million in 1890.
67  
In terms of GDP, $880,000 and $44 million were 0.01 and 0.6 percent of GDP in 1870 
and 0.006 and 0.3 percent of GDP in 1890.   These total losses are on the same order of 
magnitude as the losses that Hugh Rockoff calculated for the free banking era from 1838-
1860, a nominal $1.9 million or 0.01 percent of GDP.
68 However, they pale next to the 
losses experienced during the Great Depression.  Friedman and Schwartz calculated that 
$2.5 billion were lost by depositors and shareholders during the years 1929-1933, 
representing 2.4 percent of contemporary GDP or $39 billion in 2009 dollars.
69  One 
estimate of the costs of the savings and loan and bank failures of the early 1980s was 
$126 billion, or 3.4 percent of contemporary GDP and $200 billion in 2009 dollars.
70   
One estimate of the losses from the 2008-2009 collapse was $1.7 trillion or 11.6 percent 
of 2008 GDP.
71   
One might argue that these aggregate numbers hid the pain of high losses in 
individual years, but that does not seem to be the case.  Figure 9 reports the number of 
national bank failures in each year between 1865 and 1913 and the payout to depositors 
and other creditors.   The decade of the 1890s, punctuated by panics and four recessions 
stands out as the worst experience, but national banks then returned to the previous 
pattern of failures and payouts.  Yet, even in the most extreme years of 1891, 1894, and 
1896 when payout ratio fell to 38.7, 42.1, and 46.7 percent, losses totaled $4.2, $2.2 and 
$3.6 million.  Given that national bank deposits stood at $1,974, $1,939, and $2,141 
million, losses were no more than 0.3 percent of all deposits.  
Unfortunately, the record of losses from the state bank insolvencies has not been 
well preserved.  As previously discussed, state bank supervisors were generally not given 
control over failed banks, and consequently few statistics on failures were collected by 
                                                 
67 Carter (2006) , Series Cj209. 
68 Rockoff  (1975). 
69 Friedman and Schwartz (1963).pp. 351. 
70 White (1991). 
71 White (2009).   32
these officials.  Barnett’s study for the National Monetary Commission (1911) only found 
four partial studies.  Inference from these is difficult because no attempt was made to 
separate state, private and savings banks, partly because definitions of these institutions 
varied from state to state.  In 1879, the Comptroller investigated the failures of state, 
private and savings banks for the three previous years and found that 210 banks failed, 
which had an average payout ratio of 66 percent.
72  Trust companies were omitted from 
this and subsequent studies. The Comptroller’s own records show that there were 33 
insolvent national banks from 1876 to 1878, with payout ratios of 75.0, 98.5, and 91.3 
percent for each year.
73 In subsequent studies in 1895 and 1896, the Comptroller found 
that 1,234 of state and private institutions had failed since 1863 and had paid out less than 
50 percent of claims.  For national banks over the same span of years, 330 failed, paying 
out an average of 67.7 percent of proven claims. In 1899, the Comptroller examined state, 
private and savings banks that had failed between 1893 and 1899 and determined the 
payout ratio to be 56.19 percent.  Over this same interval, national banks paid out 74.5 
percent.   
Barnett found one additional state study.  In 1909, after reviewing the receivers’ 
reports, the Secretary of the Nebraska State Banking Board compiled some statistics for 
1901-1909.  During this period, the average deposits of state banks totaled $50 million.  
The total deposits in failed banks were $451,557.  These banks ultimately had $187,955 
in unpaid claims, implying a recovery rate of 58 percent.
74  Assessing this information is 
difficult, though it would appear that the stricter liability rules and supervision of national 
banks led to better payout ratios.  The only econometric study of the effects of double 
liability was conducted by Richard Grossman who found that double liability state banks 
were associated with lower risk taking and lower failures rates than single liability state 
banks.
75  However, his work only compares the effects of state regulations; the effects of 
stricter national bank rules, where the Comptroller not the courts enforced the laws, may 
have had a more profound effect on the safety of banks in the national system.     
Nevertheless, the state systems did not result in much larger losses to depositors.  Even 
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though failures were more numerous, state banks were significantly smaller than national 
banks, so that total losses were probably around the same order of magnitude as those 
experienced by depositors of national banks.   Addition of these losses to the totals for 
national banks would not alter the picture of very modest losses during the years 1863-
1913 compared with subsequent crises. 
  
  D. The National Banking System: An Assessment 
The National Banking era receives a mixed review in most historical accounts.  
While there was an expansion of banking services and an integration of money and 
capital markets, it is viewed as inherently flawed because of the large number of banking 
panics compared to the contemporary experience of other nations.
76 However, it is 
important to understand the defects that contributed to these crises.  First and foremost, 
the prohibition of branch banking created a system of thousands of unit banks, many of 
which had undiversified deposit bases and loan portfolios.  To clear and collect checks 
and find better use for their seasonally fluctuating balances, the country and small city 
banks relied on their correspondents in large cities.  Federal and state reserve 
requirements that permitted these banks to keep more than half their reserve on deposit in 
interest earning accounts with these same big city correspondent banks added further to 
these sizeable “bankers’ balances.  Investing heavily in the most liquid market of the day-
--call and time loans to the stock market---tied the fate of Main Street to Wall Street and 
visa versa.  Many experts realized this key weakness of the system and its origin---the 
general prohibition on branching.  But, calls for reducing the barriers to branching were 
met with fierce opposition from many unit banks that feared being driven out of business 
by branches of large banks.  In spite of the weakness of individual banks, regulation and 
supervision set the incentives and level of monitoring that ensured that losses from bank 
failures were very, modest, if not minimal.   
The second deficiency of the National Banking era was more widely 
acknowledged: the absence of a central bank.   Contemporary experts and most historians 
believe that a lender of last resort could have squelched most panics by providing credit 
to liquidity-constrained banks in the midst of a crisis.  The identification of this problem 
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points to the key fact that these panics were liquidity rather than solvency events.   
Although a few insolvent institutions might provoke initial bank runs, there were no 
system-wide failures or losses.  Which of these two problems was pre-eminent?  Many 
countries like the United Kingdom, France and Germany had both central banks and 
widespread branching.  But, the Canadian experience offers a useful comparison.  With a 
similar distribution of economic activity and seasonally fluctuating demands for credit, 
Canada had an economic structure similar to that of the U.S.  The critical difference was 
that Canada permitted nation-wide branching but had no central bank until 1935.
77  In 
contrast to the U.S., Canada did not suffer from frequent numerous bank runs and panics, 
pointing to a well-diversified integrated banking system as essential to limiting panics.   
This comparison suggests that the first priority of Congress should have been to reform 
the nation’s banking structure.  The political economy of banking, however, made this 
impossible and hence reformers focused on the establishment of the Federal Reserve. 
 
IV. The Advent of the Fed 
  A. The Incomplete Reform of Regulation and Supervision 
While the primary focus of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was the creation of a 
central bank that would be palatable to the banks and the public, the legislation did 
attempt the needed restructuring of the banking system.  The reforms of 1913 were not as 
bold as the reforms under taken in 1863-1864, leaving a good portion of the financial 
system under control of the states.  During the Civil War, Congress was willing to take a 
stick to the financial system---a tax on state banknotes---to induce banks to join the 
national banking system; but the Act of 1913 and subsequent amendments offered mostly 
carrots to bring banks into the Federal Reserve System.  The problem with the 
establishment of the Federal Reserve from the point of view of regulation and supervision 
is that it set a precedent for patching up some of the problems and failing to 
fundamentally reform the system.  The inability to do more directly contributed to the 
next great financial crisis of 1929-1933. 
  By setting up a central bank, the Federal Reserve Act created the potential for a 
conflict between the objectives of price stability and financial stability.  The failure of the 
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early leaders of the Fed to quickly recognize the implications of this conflict contributed 
to the waves of bank failures in the early 1920s and the Great Depression.   In addition, 
by giving the Federal Reserve authority to supervise state member banks the Act did not 
make a decisive decision about whether supervision should be located inside or outside of 
the central bank.  While before 1914, there had been one federal banking agency that 
squared off with the numerous state agencies, the Federal Reserve Act was the first step 
in the multiplication of federal regulatory agencies that have inherently conflicted 
interests.
78  Concerned about effectively exercising their mandates, state and federal 
agencies in the 1920s gradually weakened regulation and supervision to induce banks to 
change their charter or member status, permitting “regulatory arbitrage.”  Compounding 
these problems was a gradual reduction in transparency because the Federal Reserve 
banks were not official government agencies like the OCC and were not similarly subject 
to Congressional oversight.  The overall philosophy of bank supervision that aimed at 
reinforcing market discipline continued to inform the activities of the OCC, but the Fed’s 
additional concerns about its discount operations slowly began to undermine it. 
  
  B. Conflict between the Fed and the OCC: Examinations 
  The Federal Reserve Act created two conflicts between the Federal Reserve 
Board and the OCC.   First while membership in the Fed of existing national banks was 
mandatory, the Federal Reserve Board had the right to decide on the membership 
application of any state-chartered banks.  By granting a national charter to a bank, the 
Comptroller could create a new member bank without the approval of the Fed.  Secondly, 
the Federal Reserve Act did not contain any provision that required the Comptroller to 
provide the Board or a Federal Reserve Bank with copies of national bank 
examinations.
79 In his memoire of the Fed’s early years, The Formative Period of the 
Federal Reserve System  (1925), Governor W.P.G. Harding reported that during his eight 
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year tenure, the Comptroller granted charters for several new national banks against the 
recommendations of Federal Reserve banks and even granted national charters to state 
banks that had been refused membership, thus ensuring that they automatically acquired 
it without the consent of the Board.  As the OCC was directed to examine national banks 
twice a year, the Board deemed it unnecessary to have regular examinations, assuming 
that the OCC would furnish the Federal Reserve banks with copies of its examiners’ 
reports.  However, the Comptroller only provided limited reports, reserving the right to 
decide what information the Fed would receive. 
  The Comptroller of the Currency in office at the time of the creation of the Fed, 
John Skelton Williams, fought to maintain the prerogatives of the OCC and had icy if not 
hostile relations with the Fed. When Williams’ five-year term as Comptroller expired on 
February 2, 1919, President Wilson nominated him for another five year term,   But, 
several Senators blocked his nomination and no action was taken when Congress 
adjourned on March 4, 1919. Under the law William could continue as Comptroller until 
his successor was appointed.  When the Sixty-Sixth Congress convened, the Senate 
Committee on Banking and Currency led by a hostile chairman refused to make a 
favorable report and no action was taken, even though there appeared to be a majority of 
Senators who would have voted for his appointment.  By the end of 1920, this appeared 
to be a permanent impasse and Williams decided to retire from office early in March 
1921. During this time he became increasingly hostile to the Board.  He attacked the 
amount of credit available to New York City member banks in contrast to those in the 
interior and argued for lowering interest rates.
80  
  In these circumstances and given the escalating number of banks failures, it is 
surprising how little discussion in the literature there is about examination and 
supervision.  W. Randolph Burgess mentions the supervisory activities of the Federal 
Reserve banks only twice in his authoritative book The Reserve Banks and the Money 
Market (1927).  In his analysis of the lending activities of these banks, he emphasizes that 
both safety of rediscounts and advances are ensured by the quality of the collateral and 
the shortness of the credit.  Losses to the Federal Reserve banks were thus “negligible.” 
Member banks were required to file statements of the customers who presented paper to 
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the banks in excess of $5,000.  To verify the quality of the collateral, the New York Fed 
maintained a file on 50,000 to 60,000 individuals and businesses.  Examination gets short 
shrift: “They [the Federal Reserve Banks] maintain staffs of bank examiners who from 
time to time examine member banks and still more frequently collaborate with federal 
and state authorities in such examinations.”
81  
  In Burgess’ view a key function of examination was to provide information to 
the Federal Reserve bank officers in charge of lending to members to “prevent too 
constant or too large use of borrowing facilities.”  In New York, this gave the Fed a list of 
banks whose condition was not satisfactory so that loans to them could be scrutinized.  
Those banks that made use of Fed credit for an unreasonably long period were then 
subjected to special inquiries to determine the “necessity for the borrowing.”
82 If 
borrowing was in excess of its capital and surplus, the bank was automatically placed on 
the list for inquiry.
83 Burgess emphasized the importance of discretion in handling each 
of these cases.  The example he gives is very telling because it is a very different from the 
Comptroller’s view of the nature of supervision: 
 
Take as an example the perplexing problem of lending to a 
bank in the farming area of the Middle West in recent 
years.  The First National Bank of Crestland is loaded with 
doubtful farm paper, much of it representing sometime 
equities in real estate.  They bring all their good paper to 
the Federal Reserve Bank to rediscount.  Shall the Reserve 
Bank take it and lend them the money?  If the Reserve 
Bank refuses, failure may follow.  If it makes the loan, it 
assumes the responsibilities of continuing in operation a 
bank probably insolvent.  If failure should then come the 
depositors might find much of the good assets re-
discounted at the Reserve Bank and unavailable to pay 
depositors.  The Reserve Bank must consider not only the 
safety of its loan, but the interests of the depositors.  Can 
the bank be saved by a loan?  If not, will the depositors be 
better off under an immediate liquidation, or a later 
liquidation, when the bank may have dissipated many of its 
best assets? These are some of the questions the Reserve 
Bank has to face.  The answer depends on a careful scrutiny 
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of each bank, in constant cooperation with state and 
national supervisory authorities. (Burgess, 1927, p. 236-7) 
 
  On this matter the Fed ran into a conflict with the OCC, especially under 
Williams, which believed that it should not disclose the information collected during 
examinations to the Fed, except where it might have direct bearing on its discount 
operations.  What Burgess recognized was the discount window had created moral hazard 
for banks that borrowed.  Following Walter Bagehot’s Lombard Street, a nineteenth 
century European central bank might not have worried about the total condition of a 
borrowing bank, just whether it had good collateral.  But, the Fed apparently assumed 
responsibility for the depositors and creditors of the bank.  
  This shift in the approach to supervision was abetted by the struggle between 
the Fed and the OCC for control of supervision.  This contest arose because the Fed tried 
to appease state member banks who objected being subject to the same, more stringent 
regulations as national banks.  Rather than coerce them to adhere to these regulations and 
risk their departure from the system, the Fed slowly weakened supervision for all national 
and state member banks.  Just as state banks did not jump to become national banks after 
the National Bank Act of 1864, so too were few state-chartered banks convinced of the 
benefits of Fed membership that they willingly submitted to its generally more rigorous 
regulations.   The Federal Reserve Act had tried to bring in most institutions into the fold 
by a variety of changes, lowering reserve requirements and differentiating between 
demand and time deposits and giving trust powers to national banks.
84  But, few state 
banks responded; and by 1917, only 53 of the over 19,000 state banks had taken out 
membership.   Amendments to the Act of 1913 made membership slightly more attractive 
to larger state institutions and membership rose to 513 in 1918 and 1,042 in 1919, 
cresting at 1,648 in 1922.  While these state banks accounted for half of all state banks’ 
assets, there were still 19,000 outside the regulatory purview of any federal agency.  At 
the same time the number of national banks under the aegis of the Comptroller slowly 
rose from 7,518 in 1914 to a peak of 8,236 in 1923.  Needless to say, the Federal Reserve 
was very sensitive to any slippage in the number of its members. 
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  The most visible example of the effects of competition between agencies 
followed from the transfer of authority to request call reports from the OCC to the Fed 
and the resultant decline in the number of call reports.  The Federal Reserve Act gave the 
Board of Governors the power to demand reports and examine member banks, but 
initially the OCC carried out examination of state member banks in addition to national 
banks. When in 1915, Comptroller Williams asked for a sixth report and more detailed 
information, he provoked a flood of complaints.
85.  As a consequence of this uproar and 
the inequality between the requirements imposed on national and state member banks, the 
1917 Amendment to the Federal Reserve Act ordered state member banks to make their 
reports of condition to their Federal Reserve bank, setting the minimum number of call 
reports at three---not the five required of national banks.  Furthermore, the power to set 
call dates was transferred to the Board.  In 1916, the surprise call year-end call reports 
were abandoned.
86   
This regime shift was not completed until after Williams left office in late 1921.  
But, once he had departed, disclosure began to weaken.  In 1922, the number of reports 
fell back to five---the number that had been requested continuously since 1870.
87  Then in 
1923, it dropped to four and remained at that level for 1924 and 1925.  There is no 
comment in the Annual Reports of the Comptroller of the Currency or the Federal 
Reserve Board or in the Federal Reserve Bulletin; but in 1926, there were only three call 
reports---one for April 12, June 30, and December 3. In 1927, the Board called for four 
reports, a number it adhered to in subsequent years. What is missing for 1926 is the report 
that was traditionally called for in October, a shocking omission as this is the most fateful 
month of the year for financial crises.  Why was it omitted?  While the answer may lie 
somewhere in the archives of the Federal Reserve, there are two possible reasons.  The 
Fed could have been under pressure from the national banks to reduce their reporting and 
put them on a par with state member banks.  If so, this is an example of the “competition 
in laxity” between state and federal regulators that had led to a reduction of capital and 
reserve requirements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and continues to 
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bedevil contemporary American regulators.
88  Alternatively, the Fed may have been 
alarmed by the condition of some banks, given that real estate values had begun to 
decline in the third quarter of 1926.  The decision to skip the October call might have 
been made to give banks time to raise capital or make other adjustments.  If this were the 
case, it represented a significant shift towards discretionary supervision.   
  The record of bank examination reveals no such obvious deterioration and in fact, 
the Federal Reserve Act adopted some of the recommendations that pre-1913 
Comptrollers had long requested.  The payment of a fixed fee for each bank examined 
had caused the examinations to be less than a surprise as examiners movements became 
more predictable as they sought to minimized travel costs.  The new Federal Reserve 
regime eliminated this incentive and put examiners on a salary and paid their expenses.  
In addition they were provided with paid assistants.
89 The OCC also gained an increased 
ability to monitor its examiners, reorganizing its operations by Federal Reserve District 
and appointing a chief national bank examiner with responsibility for all examiners in the 
district.
90 Although the Comptroller was initially responsible for examining state member 
banks, the 1917 Amendment transferred this power to the Federal Reserve banks who 
organized their own examination departments.
91 
 
  C. Examination in the Early Fed Years 
  The resources available to the Comptroller under this new regime are shown in 
Table 2.   The increase in resources devoted to examination is marked, but probably 
reflects the need to manage the growing number of insolvencies.  In 1915, the number of 
examiners was little different, perhaps a bit lower than in 1913.   But, beginning in 1916, 
there is a steady rise, peaking in 1923 at 234 examiners, nearly double the number before 
the foundation of the Fed.   As the number of national banks changed little, the number of 
banks per examiner declined to the mid-thirties.   This change suggests that examiners 
had more time to spend per bank; however it is unclear how much of this increase was 
associated with the higher number of bank failures in the early 1920s.  There are two 
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91State banks complained about bearing the cost of state examinations in addition to those of the Fed, 
though the Board could accept state examinations in lieu of additional federal ones (Kirn, 1945, p. 164).   41
series representing the resources that are not completely compatible nor do they overlap.  
The first is the traditional revenue from the fees or assessments from examinations, and 
the second is the reported examination expenses, which would include salaries and travel 
expenses of the examiners.  Nevertheless, they show the same pattern, doubling in real 
terms from the years around the founding of the Fed to the mid-1920s, but again the 
published record is silent whether this represents any change in supervision activity or the 
management of failing banks. 
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1914  7,518     520,607 520,607    
1915  7,597 103  74 536,300 519,540     
1916  7,571 124  61 577,763 496,943     
1917  7,599 131  58 849,816 592,561     
1918  7,699 137  56 994,626 595,335     
1919  7,779 149  52 1,050,977 613,758  1,181,449 689,951
1920  8,024 153  52 1,184,027 607,110  1,363,870 699,324
1921  8,169 195  42 1,769,395 1,064,212 7,808,273 4,696,326
1922  8,225 214  38 2,159,510 1,374,402 3,839,805 2,443,811
1923  8,184 234  35 2,145,392 1,327,930 2,145,391 1,327,929
1924  8,049 226  36 2,293,545 1,437,571 2,168,731 1,359,339
1925  8,054 221  36     2,091,059 1,287,871
1926  7,912 221  36     2,295,122 1,407,725
1927  7,765 227  34     2,291,408 1,439,871
1928  7,635 219  35     2,308,250 1,439,512
1929  7,408 204  36     2,409,858 1,497,857
Source: U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, (1914-1929). 
 
  The Federal Reserve banks initially relied on the Comptroller’s examiners and 
state supervisors examiners, only slowly creating their own examination staffs.  The 
Federal Reserve Board created its own staff of examiners whose numbers are shown in 
Table 3.  Conscious that state-chartered banks had no desire to be examined by two 
regulatory authorities, the Fed was given discretion to use the reports of state authorities.  
As a result, the relatively large number of banks per examiner does not imply that the Fed 
make less effort than the OCC to examine its banks. 
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Table 3 
State-Chartered Member Banks 
 and Federal Reserve Board Examiners 
1915-1929 












1915  17 6 3 
1916  34 5 7 
1917  53 11 5 
1918  513 14 37 
1919  1042 20 52 
1920  1374 18 76 
1921  1595 18 89 
1922  1648 22 75 
1923  1620 22 74 
1924  1570 21 75 
1925  1472 21 70 
1926  1403 18 78 
1927  1309 17 77 
1928  1244 17 73 
1929  1177 18 65 
   
Note: For 1918-1929, the number of examiners includes assistant examines. 
Source:  Board of Governors (1943), p. 22, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Annual Report (1914-1929). 
 
 
IV. Price Stability v. Financial Stability 
  A. The Unexpected Deflation Shock  
Against this backdrop of interagency conflict, the conflict between the twin goals 
of price stability and financial stability quickly emerged.  When inflation began to pick 
up speed in 1920, the Federal Reserve responded by quickly raising interest rates.
92  This 
action, often deemed to be an excessive response, produced a sharp recession and a 
significant deflation.  There was no historical precedent that would have prepared the 
financial sector for this action.  During the Civil War, the price level had more than 
doubled but the deflation that permitted the U.S. join the gold standard at its prewar 
parity was gradual, lasting from 1866 to 1879.  After World War I when the price level 
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nearly doubled between 1914 and 1920, it tumbled 22 percent between 1920 and 1922.
93  
Banks that had been riding the wartime and postwar booms were hit hardest, with the 
small banks in agricultural areas suffering the most as commodity prices plummeted. 
  
Figure 10 
Bank Failures and Inflation 
1865-1929 





















Sources: U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, (1914), p. 104; Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (1943), p. 283. Carter (2006), Series Ca13. 
 
Figure 10 shows the percentage of state and national bank failures and the inflation rate 
between 1865 and 1929.  The unprecedented deflation was accompanied by a lagged 
increase in bank failures, as its effects gradually brought a rise in farm foreclosures.
94  
During the years 1921-1929, 766 national banks and 4,645 state banks failed.   The 
number of national bank insolvencies was far greater than the 501 insolvencies of 1865-
1913.   Worse yet, the payout ratio for national banks dropped to 40 percent for a total 
loss of $565 million ($6.9 billion in 2009 dollars) or 0.8% of 1925 GDP.
95  The banking 
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system might have recovered from this one time shock, as it had recovered from the 
1890s, with modest numbers of failures and relatively high payouts.  However, the 
second great unanticipated deflationary shock of the Great Depression prevented a 
complete recovery.   In addition, this onetime shock muddied the water for identifying 
other more subtle changes in policy described above.     
  
B.  Seasonal Interest Rate and Discount Policies 
  Beyond this deflationary event, two permanent features of the Federal Reserve 
changed the incentives for banks to take risks: its seasonal interest rate policy and its 
discount policy. In the Federal Reserve Act, the Fed was charged with furnishing “an 
elastic currency.”  For the Fed it was a central obligation to eliminate the seasonal strain 
in financial markets.  As its first Annual Report emphasized “its duty is not to await 
emergencies but by anticipation, to do what it can to prevent them.”
96  Miron (1986) 
documented that the Federal Reserve promptly carried out policies that reduced the 
seasonality of interest rates. Because panics occurred in periods when seasonal increases 
in loan demand and decreases in deposit demand strained the financial system, 
accommodating credit to seasonal shocks reduced the potential of a crisis. Comparing 
1890-1908 and 1919-1928, Miron found the standard deviation of the seasonal for call 
loans fell from 130 to 46 basis points, with the amplitude dropping from 600 to 230 basis 
points.   The reduction of seasonality in interest rates lowered the stress on the financial 
system, leading Miron to conclude that it had eliminated banking panics during the period 
1915-1929.  Most striking, was the absence of a panic during the severe recession of 
1920-1921.  Both the timing in the decline of seasonality and the role of the Fed have 
been challenged, but Miron’s basic results have been upheld.
97   
  This seasonal interest rate policy is visible in Figure 11, which displays the time 
rate for stock market loans and the commercial paper rate.  Before the establishment of 
the Fed, businessmen and their bankers had to be wary of the sharp seasonal fluctuations, 
with the sometime accompanying financial panic.  Once fears had been dampened, banks 
could more readily take risks, knowing that they would not be subject to the sharp interest 
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rate spikes in the past.  In this environment, a quick deflationary shock such as 1920-







  Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943), pp.458-451. 
  
  In addition, a bank which found itself in trouble could, if it were a member of a 
Federal Reserve bank, borrow at the discount window.  Banks in trouble now had a new 
option.  Where before they could voluntarily liquidate or continue with the risk of 
ultimately becoming insolvent.  At the discount window, they could borrow using some 
of their good assets and try to recoup their losses.  The danger for depositors and other 
creditors was that such a bank would pay out less if it failed because it had pledged more 
good assets at the Fed’s window.   This was the problem that Burgess had identified, 
though he thought that the “careful scrutiny” of the regulators would be sufficient to 
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Unfortunately, contrary to Burgess’s hopeful expectations, many banks became 
long-term borrowers at the discount window.  In 1925, the Federal Reserve Board 
collected data on the indebtedness of member banks to their Federal Reserve banks.     
This information revealed that contrary to the expectations of the fathers of the Fed, the 
discount window turned out to have been more than a facility to increase short-term 
liquidity.  On August 31, 1925, 593 banks had been borrowing for a year or more.
98 Out 
of this total 239 had been borrowing continuously since 1920.   These banks appear to 
have been severely troubled institutions and the Fed estimated that 80 percent of the 259 
national member banks that had failed since 1920 had been “habitual borrowers.”  This 
problem was confirmed in later years.  Of the 457 banks that had been borrowing for 




C. The Growing Cost of Bank Failures 
How did this regime affect the closing of banks and the losses to depositors and 
creditors?  First, there was no change is the liability of national bank shareholders who 
were still subject to double liability.  However, there was one significant change 
engineered by the Act of November 7, 1918.  Before this act, if two national banks 
wanted to merge, one had to be liquidated to permit the other to purchase its assets and 
assume its liabilities.  Out of the numerous voluntary liquidations, very few banks chose 
this option.  After 1918, the two banks could consolidate under either charter, subject to 
approval of the Comptroller of the Currency.  Previously prohibited from acquiring 
branches, this legal change gave national banks a crude means to acquire them in states 
where branching was permitted.
100  While liquidations before 1918 had rarely been used 
as a means to consolidate, now banks that were weak might be tempted to combine with a 
stronger bank.   This change in the menu of choices makes the comparison of bank 
closures before and after 1913 difficult.   
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Table 4 provides data on national bank closures for the years 1921-1929.   The 
number of annual suspensions, which approximates the number of insolvent banks, rose 
considerably during the twenties, largely because of the post-World War I agricultural 
crisis.  Voluntary liquidations were less frequent and consolidations and absorptions were 
on the rise.  Yet, even if one treats consolidations and absorptions as voluntary 
liquidations, as they might have been before 1914, then the sum of the two 113 and 1104 
is still not twice the number of suspensions.  In the National Banking era, voluntary 
liquidations outnumbered insolvencies by a factor of four.  White knights may have been 
found for some troubled banks, but fewer banks were taking the cautious path of 
voluntary liquidation.    
 
Table 4 














1921  52 12 74 
1922  49 8 107 
1923  90 20 96 
1924  122 28 96 
1925  118 14 81 
1926  123 12 129 
1927  91 9 160 
1928  57 7 136 
1929  64 3 225 
Total  766 113 1104 
 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Banking and Monetary Statistics (1943), p. 
52. 
 
Again the temporary deflationary shock of 1920-1921 makes it difficult to 
evaluate the change in the payout ratio for insolvent banks from the permanent 
innovations by the Fed.  While this ratio averaged around 40 percent for the 1920s, the 
deflationary shock should have abated considerably by the end of the decade.  However, 
the ratio only reached 50 percent in 1929, which is suggestive, though not conclusive   48
evidence that banks were responding to the new incentives, taking increased risks relative 
to the years before 1913.
101 
  The changes in bank supervision witnessed in the first fifteen year of the Federal 
Reserve had subtle effects on bank behavior and outcomes. A small but significant 
minority of banks became dependent on the discount window, voluntary liquidations 
were down, suspensions increased, and payouts declined.  These changes did not de-
stabilize the system that had arisen during the National Banking era and aggregate losses 
remained very modest.  In the absence of the Great Depression, Burgess’optimism might 
have eventually proved warranted if one is willing to make some strong assumptions.  If 
competition in laxity and regulatory arbitrage had been brought under control and 
supervision reduced the number of borrowers at the discount window, bank failures and 
payouts might have returned to the lower levels of the pre-1913 era.  If one doubts the 
ability to make these changes effective then the American banking system was stuck with 
a more costly supervisory regime. 
 
V. Après le Deluge 
  These conjectures seem “academic” because of the change that swept over 
supervision with the Great Depression.   The assumption of the New Dealers was that 
regime of regulation and supervision inherited from the National Banking System had 
failed.  Yet this regime had kept losses to depositors to a minimum for the fifty years 
before 1914, in spite of a fragmented banking structure and the absence of a central bank.   
It even appears to have held up reasonably well after the creation of the Fed and the large 
unanticipated deflationary shock of 1920-1921. Nevertheless, because of a grand 
misdiagnosis, the New Deal swept aside this successful regime and imposed a radically 
different one that sharply increased moral hazard and risk-taking.  
  The depression devastated the banking system in the years 1929-1933.  The 
unexpected series of deflationary shocks led prices to fall 23 percent and contributed to 
the 39 percent drop in GDP.
102  In July 1929, commercial banks, which numbered 
24,504, held $49 billion in deposits.  By the time the bank holiday ended only 11,878 
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banks with $23 billion in deposits were deemed strong enough to open immediately.  The 
losses from insolvent banks, half to depositors and half to shareholders, reached an 
unprecedented $2.5 billion or 2.4 percent of GDP.
103   
  As is well known, the defects of the banking system and even the character of 
bankers were held to be primary causes of the depression; and the New Deal responded 
with a major reform effort to alter regulation and supervision.   Although the influence of 
specific lobbies within the banking industry, notably unit bankers and independent 
investment bankers have been identified in designing and lobbying for new regulation, 
the general argument was that the competitive market had failed and needed to be 
subjected to a thorough regulation.  The competitive market was replaced by a loosely 
organized government cartel with controls on many dimensions of entry and pricing.  
This change was based on a failure to recognize that it was large deflationary shocks that 
had undermined the banking system and the rest of the economy, not unbridled 
competition.   
The massive number of bank failures presented supervision with huge new 
challenges.  In the past, it was thought that bank examiners could use market prices to 
judge the solvency of an institution.  The increased volatility of price expectations, 
accompanying the jagged downward path of the economy, made the valuation of assets 
extremely difficult.   But, instead of identifying the mistakes in monetary policy as the 
primary culprit, the reformers argued that markets failed to accurately value assets.     
Examiners were now instructed to value assets according to the “intrinsic value” they 
would have when the economy recovered.  Supervision abandoned efforts to reinforce 
market discipline and instead was given discretion to make independent judgments, 
permitting forbearance in closing insolvent institutions that might recover later 
The most high profile New Deal change, the creation of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation was accompanied by a change that has all but been forgotten---the 
abandonment of double liability. Shareholders under the threat of high assessments 
pleaded with legislatures to change the law, while the general public saw little benefit for 
retaining this rule.
104 Additionally, it was assumed that since depositors were protected by 
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FDIC insurance, they would no longer need the protection afforded by double liability.  
The extra incentive for shareholders to more carefully monitor directors was erased, 
leaving supervision with a heavier monitoring burden.   The visible effect of double 
liability, voluntary liquidations disappeared.   Banks were not closed before they failed, 
or even shortly after they became insolvent.  The increased difficulty of monitoring them 
and growing moral hazard, with perhaps forbearance, meant that they would be closed 
only when they were gravely insolvent. 
The proliferation of New Deal and post-New deal federal regulatory agencies 
created more competition in laxity with opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and even 
regulatory capture.   The sheer number of agencies involved in bank supervision, the 
OCC, the Fed, the FDIC, the SEC, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the Federal 
Home Loan banks, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, and the 
National Credit Union Administration made it more difficult for Congress to provide 
effective oversight.   
The incentive effects of these vast changes were, however, hidden for decades.   
The Great Depression had winnowed out all but the stronger institutions and induced 
them to abandon loans for U.S. government bonds.  To serve its enormous financing 
needs during World War II, the federal government pushed banks to enlarge even further 
their bond portfolios.
105  By the end of the war, banks had become extremely safe 
institutions, and then it would take decades to unwind from their bond-saturated positions 
and permit the full effects of the New Deal incentives to operate.  This adjustment was 
finished by the late 1970s, when inflationary shocks created a perfect storm that caused 
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